Cyprus is experiencing several small struggles—microcosms of some of the most difficult issues in the Middle East. Trying to help Cyprus would be an ideal test-run for ambitious designs in the Middle East and would provide fitting lessons to those involved. 

Since 1974, Cyprus has been divided between Turkish-Cypriots in the North and Greek-Cypriots in the South. The lack of cooperation, continued altercations, and waste of resources in keeping the peace, are all costs that would exist in Iraq if it were split into Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish states. Cyprus is more difficult because the rising generations do not even know that their enemies were once their neighbors, and they now possess distinct currencies, governments, and languages. Still, the issue is the same for both—uniting people who consider themselves too different.

The property and border issues in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict are similar to those in Cyprus. Questions of unification and remunerations for lost property in Cyprus would hopefully be easier, with the takeover being only 35 years ago.  Deciding what to do with Cyprus’ 180km green line is not as messy as the occupied territories but is still an issue. Any solution being considered for the Holy Land should be more successful in Cyprus. A test run of any scheme currently being proposed would be an opportunity to learn from mistakes and fix them when dealing with more contentious conflicts.

Negotiators can learn about the high value of present incentives and the heavily discounted value of past incentives from Cyprus. Diplomats gave the southern half of the island EU membership and global recognition without any strings attached. As a result, Southern Cyprus has felt no need to be gracious and welcome Turkey into the EU or to progress towards unification with the northern half. In order to avoid repeating this mistake, America needs to resist the urge to unquestionably back up Israeli, Yemeni, Pakistani, or Afghani governments with financial and military support until they begin to change and tackle their national issues that could threaten our national security.

Policymakers should take note that one of the greatest obstacles to unification is that Greek and Turkish Cypriots do not seem to want peace and unification more than outside actors do. A change in values and priorities could only happen if outside mollifying actions are removed. Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom (the guarantee powers of the island) will not solve Cyprus; America will not solve Iraq, Afghanistan, or Yemen; and the UN will not solve the Holy Land: there is either too much disdain for past actions or too much suspicion for present motives. A spark needs to be lit within the countries that are intimately involved in the conflict.

A possible solution would be a complete withdrawal of all UN, Turkish, and British forces from Cyprus with an immediate and de facto unification of the North and South. There is a risk that the country could descend into civil war, but it would be better to implode Cyprus on an unproven withdrawal strategy, where there is limited spillover, than Iraq this summer. If Iraq implodes after the American withdrawal, it might be justified recompense to the regional nations that have not sent as many troops to help Iraq as Moldova has (Jordan, Syria, Kuwait, Iran, and Saudi Arabia), but more instability in the Middle East is undesirable. The results of a withdrawal in Cyprus would foreshadow the likelihood of success with President Obama’s withdrawal from Iraq and would provide opportunities to learn from what goes right and what goes wrong. Without prior experiment, all there is is hope.

The fate of Iraq need not rest on hope alone. There is a ready practice ground 100km west of the Middle East where the problems are smaller, simpler, and less volatile. Fixing Cyprus should be done as a warm up before tackling bigger problems nearby.

Brigham is a senior studying economics and mathematics with an Arabic minor.